Docs 📚
E2EE, configuration, threat model, ...
Process and protocol boundaries
This note maps the live room, WebRTC, and native surfaces so later sidecar and E2EE work reuse existing names instead of replacing them.
End-to-end encryption threat model
p2p.kiwi is a desktop WebRTC mesh. There is no application signaling server. Invite URLs carry SDP out of band. STUN/TURN may still observe connection metadata.
MLS implementation for p2p.kiwi
ts-mls (MIT, RFC 9420) behind the `RoomCrypto` interface for group membership and epoch key management. Media keys and high-frequency application keys are derived with MLS exporters and domain-separated labels.
Native overlay sidecar
p2p.kiwi ships an Odin helper (`p2p-kiwi-sidecar`) for always-on-top, click-through cursor overlays. Electron main is the only process that starts it. The renderer never executes sidecar commands.
macOS sidecar manual checklist
Interactive checks for overlays, permissions, and emergency stop on a Mac. Signing and notarization are enforced in GitHub Actions.